Political Developments in Hong Kong. Implications for 1997

Hong Kong's political system has undergone a series of major transformations since the second world war. Those changes have been partly as a consequence of reaction to the changing demands emanating from informal actors within the territory, and partly as a function of government initiatives responding, sometimes reluctantly, sometimes proactively, to economic, social and political pressure. Most significantly, however, Hong Kong's political destiny has been dominated by the simple fact that it is not, and never will be, a sovereign state. For over one hundred and fifty years (excluding the Japanese occupation from 1941 until 1945) Britain has been the sovereign master, and on June 30, 1997 Hong Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty as a Special Administrative Region. Rarely has the term coined by Beijing during the protracted negotiations between the British and Chinese over the political future of the territory between 1982 and 1984, of "gangren zhigang" (Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong) been more in the forefront of political debate than it is now. The crucial question for the future is the degree of autonomy the territory will be allowed after the hand over. Will Hong Kong, as stated in the Joint Declaration of 1984, and further elaborated in Hong Kong's mini constitution the Basic Law, be able to exercise authority in the conduct of its domestic affairs, or is the future Special Administrative Region to be controlled from Beijing with the promise of a high level of independence mere empty rhetoric?

It may be reasonable argued that Hong Kong has, since its acquisition in 1841, experienced a number of political transformations. In each case the emphasis, with the one notable exception of the Japanese occupation, has been on evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, with a high degree of continuity between one stage and the next. Indeed, in some respects the original assumptions relating to the role and functions of government have remained remarkably consistent, at least in philosophical terms if not in actual practice.

Hong Kong was acquired in three separate parts. The first part was Hong Kong Island ceded under the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 (ratified in 1843). The second part, ceded in perpetuity under the 1860 Convention of Peking, comprised the southern part of the Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters Island. The third part, the New Territories, under the 1898 Convention was leased by the Qing dynasty to the United Kingdom for ninety nine years with the lease running out on June 30, 1997. See British State Papers Vol.30 p.389, British State Papers Vol. 50, p.10 and British State Papers Vol. 90, p.17 respectively.

The form of government did not entertain the concept of the franchise. Considerable power was placed in the hands of the Governor and his advisors on the Executive Council. The Legislative Council was made up of official members of the government and selected persons, largely in sympathy with policies made by the Executive branch. Government intervention in the running of the colony was minimalist and largely restricted to ensuring that business conducted its daily affairs untrammelled by high taxation, interference or any other major hindrance. The civil service, represented at all levels of government had a formal political role, not only of administrating policy but making it also. There was little social provision beyond that which was absolutely essential, for example, in the fields of law and order, defence and public sanitation. Housing, health and education, such as they were relied largely on the private sector and were woefully inadequate.

Benevolent paternalism was the order of the day. The bulk of the population were excluded from the decision making nexus. However, as the colonial model progressed, a remarkable consensus developed between the ruling expatriate elite and the local Chinese emerging elite. Both agreed on the rules of the game so that the latter was quite happy with the free wheeling capitalist system, strong central government, minimum intervention and the lack of any initiatives towards representative government.

Although Hong Kong was a colony under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, there was increasing agreement that the colonial government allowed a very high degree of autonomy is the running of the territory. Naturally, foreign and defence matters were in the hands of Britain. Even Republican China, who wanted the colony returned never pressed the matter too heavily - and the People's Republic of China, which came to power in 1949, whilst refusing to recognise the legality of Britain's continued occupation of Hong Kong, were quite happy to allow its administration by the colonial power.

The old colonial model was, however, increasingly out of sympathy with the changing social and economic environment in the post second world war period. Hong Kong's economic miracle, combined with a large increase in its population demanded a radical overhaul of the machinery of government and in its relationship between ruler and ruled. The slow, and often reluctant reforms in governmental practices, were by the middle sixties in dire need of attention. Unfortunately colonial governments, particularly those where the civil service are granted considerable political powers, are rarely minded to recognise change and Hong Kong was no exception. It took two major events to pull the decision makers out of their complacency.

These two events, one internally generated in 1966 and the other imported in 1967 from the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution over the border, constituted an overt challenge to the authority of the Hong Kong Government. Both events culminated in mass demonstrations against the government. The second, and more frightening of the two, showed quite clearly that there was an increasing gulf between the largely expatriate governing elite and the mass of the population of Hong Kong.

The result was a major overhaul of the form of governance of the territory which resulted in the Consultative Model of government. Such a reforms did not include any real attempts at representative government through the electoral process at central level. Such a process was effectively hamstrung by an effective veto, although never publicly voiced, by the People's Republic of China. The basis for the new model was the rationalisation and expansion of the Civil Service, the setting up of advisory committees on policy to reflect aspects of public opinion and the strengthening of the Government Information Service (GIS) to promote a two way flow between government and governed.

Most significant, probably, were two other changes. The first was the appointment of a highly reformist Governor, Sir Murray Mclehose. The second was the recognition that the provision of social services needed to be expanded rapidly if public dissatisfaction was to be avoided. These reforms, which were quickly instituted, coincided with the rapid increase in the territories Gross Domestic Product, thus making increased government intervention simpler in that it could be painlessly provided without any increase in taxation. The period 1967 until the opening of negotiations over the future of the territory were probably the most stable and prosperous in Hong Kong's history. Rarely did GDP growth fall below 10% per year, huge advances were made in housing provision, health and education so that the mass of the population could see living standards increase without any one sector having to pay higher taxes for such improvements.

Corruption, which had been a major structural problem, was brought under control, demonstrations virtually disappeared, standards of living went up across the board and the PRC, now emerging from the excesses of the Cultural Revolution appeared content with the status quo in Hong Kong. Locally pressure groups were accommodated from a far wider sector of the society, a free press proliferated and localisation of business, the civil service and the legislature, although slow was gathering pace. The few voices calling for institutional democracy, although present, were by and large supported only by the emerging middle class intellectuals, teachers and social workers, with opposition from the elite and China and indifference in the working class conspiring against them. The United Kingdom's stance on this matter was quite simply to allow the territory to run itself, which given its stability and economic success is hardly surprising.

However, the problem of the future of the territory after 1997 still lay unresolved. The PRC, whilst allowing the British to continue to administer the territory, maintained that the treaties which had originally ceded Hong Kong to the British were invalid in international law and, in any case, the New Territories had to be returned under the conditions of the 1898 agreement. The question was how to resolve this problem in a form that was acceptable to Britain, China and which would not damage the delicate balance in Hong Kong itself?

Formal negotiations were opened between the two sovereign powers in 1983. Despite early acrimonious disputes over the question of sovereignty, an agreement was signed on 19 December 1984. This agreement, entitled " A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong" outlined the future political shape of the territory up to and beyond 1997. These agreements established a general framework based on a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong within a "One Country Two Systems" framework. Under that agreement Hong Kong would revert from British administration to Chinese sovereignty with effect from July 1,1997. At the same time the political, social, economic and independent judicial system of the territory would remain intact and distinctly different from that of the mainland. Private ownership was guaranteed, separate customs arrangements would operate, the Hong Kong dollar would remain the currency for the territory, public order would remain the responsibility of the Hong Kong government, the territory would be allowed to enter into economic and cultural agreements with other states and organizations and the rights of free speech, free press and religious worship were guaranteed. In short, these provisions and others were intended to guarantee the lifestyle of the territory, unique and different from that of China. Such a lifestyle was to remain intact for fifty years after 1997.

One major problem, and hence a source of potential conflict, relating to the agreements was that many crucial areas were left vague and ambiguous and therefore subject to different interpretation. For instance, in the constitutional field, it was specifically stated that,"The Legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections" and that the "chief executive shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally". In neither case did the arrangements specify

precisely how many legislators should be elected, the form of election, and who the electorate might be. It was agreed, however, that a Joint Liaison Group (JLG) would be established, consisting of British and Chinese members, the senior member of Ambassadorial rank, whose primary function would be to iron out these problems.

Two other parts of the agreement of some note related to the need to intensify consultation and close cooperation in the second half of the transition period so that differences between the governments of the People's Republic of China and Britain would be referred to the JLG for solution through consultations. Little noticed at the time was a statement which allowed for the elaboration of the agreements in a "Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, by the National People's Congress".

The period between the Joint Agreements and the promulgation of the Basic Law can be divided fairly neatly into two major phases. The first lasted until June 1989 and the second was the brief period between June and the promulgation of the Basic Law on April 4, 1990 which was to be put into effect as of July 1, 1997. The actual details were drawn up, not by the Hong Kong government or any British representatives, but by a Basic Law drafting committee, which was dominated by members from the mainland with local members selected by the Chinese authorities.

For the first phase, when the Basic Law was being drafted, it appeared as though the Basic Law document, which was, in effect a mini constitution intended to fit into the wider state constitution of the People's Republic of China, would not differ widely from the Joint Declaration. In the Hong Kong legislature elections were held for the first time in 1985, but only for a minority of the seats and none of which were filled by universal suffrage. Furthermore, the 1987 White Paper stated that the first directly elected seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) based on geographical constituencies would take place only in 1991. The government in the People's Republic of China were most lukewarm towards these and, indeed, any other attempts to widen the nature of representation at lower levels of government. They warned, even at this early stage, against any developments which might contradict the evolving draft of the future Basic Law. However, in the face of an outcry from many sectors in the Hong Kong community the statement was retracted and it appeared as if the Chinese were willing to allow the limited introduction of directly elected seats into the Legislative Council. What was clear, however, was that even at this stage, the British government was not pushing heavily for a fully directly elected legislative body, but rather for modest improvements which they hoped would satisfy the increasing calls in the territory to speed up democratic representation whilst not alienating the Chinese government.

The general position during this period was one of limited cooperation rather than conflict between the British and Chinese. Most of the differences were subject to confidential closed door meetings with the Joint Liaison Group (JLG). Pressure from the United Kingdom or Hong Kong officials on many of the outstanding issues was muted to say the least. The business of converging with the requirements of the future Special Administrative Region (SAR) seemed to be on a fairly even course despite occasional minor

On June 4, 1989 an event occurred in the People's Republic which was to revolutionise the situation. On that day government troops in Beijing initiated the massacre at Tiananman Square following orders from the political hierarchy. International indignation was widespread, not least in Hong Kong. Huge demonstrations protesting the action were held in the territory with an estimated 500,000 joining in peaceful demonstrations and calling for support for the democracy movement in China. The non communist press in the territory was scathing in its criticism of Beijing's action and large amounts of money were raised to help the student movement across the border. Reaction from the authorities in the People's Republic of China was equally scathing, both in the mainland and local left wing press in the territory. In this climate were the final touches of the Basic Law put into place reflecting the fear and suspicion of the leaders in Beijing. In their eyes the inhabitants of Hong Kong were encouraging dissent within the PRC, exhibiting support for "subversive" elements, helping those escaping "justice" to find asylum in the west and siding with the west in condemnation of the massacre.

The next action taken by the mainland officials was to make it crystal clear that the composition of the Legislative Council would not be based on territory - wide, freely held elections for all the seats. The Basic Law stipulated that only one third of the seats would be directly elected with the breakdown as follows:

It was therefore clear, as a consequence of the Basic Law, that the People's Republic of China were determined to establish the rule that a powerful and independent legislative body, with a fully elected membership and based on geographical constituencies, was out of the question. The provisions of the Basic Law were not subject to negotiation or modification under any circumstances. Any attempts to undermine the mini constitution they argued would hinder the smooth transition of the territory, undermine "stability and prosperity" and disrupt "convergence". In effect, the years from 1990 until 1997 were seen by Beijing as the years in which the initiative would move from the British administration to that of China. The PRC, as will be seen, were highly suspicious of the motives of both the British and Hong Kong governments. They increasingly believed that both were working to undermine Chinese authority in the territory for economic or political purpose. The Hong Kong government's decision to go ahead with a

To compound the situation even further there were developments in Hong Kong which were beginning to cause the PRC authorities considerable concern, and which helped to harden its position over future developments in the territory. Political parties, which had been developing in the territory, were now formally established. Some of these parties were outspoken in their criticism of China's internal political record, critical of the slow pace of democratisation in Hong Kong, and vociferous in their attacks on the British government demanding that London take a tougher stance against the PRC in the interests of the Hong Kong people.

The first and most important party of this type was the United Democrats of Hong Kong established, hardly coincidentally, in April 1990, and led by Martin Lee who had been expelled from the Basic Law Drafting Committee. This was followed by the creation of another liberally inclined party, the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation in May 1990.

In the elections of 1991, the first with a directly elected element in the history of the territory, there was a virtually clean sweep for the liberal candidates in the limited number of directly elected seats to the Legislative Council. In fact, the United Democrats took twelve of the eighteen seats up for election, with other allied or closely connected liberal, candidates taking four more. The United Democrats alone received 45% of the votes, and if to that is added the other candidates from the liberal wing, constituted 67.5% of the total number of votes cast.

very badly. Its manifesto, based largely on the stated need to collaborate with China, polled only 5.1% of the vote. The fellow travellers on the United Front despite the support of the left wing trade unions, who obviously argued on an uncritical pro-China line, managed to attract only 7.9% of the vote. This was, despite the low turn out for the election, an overwhelming defeat for the PRC. This trend of support for the Democrats and their allies was furthere endorsed in the September 1995 geographical constituency elections to the Legislative Council. The pro-democracy movement gained 64% of the votes, the pro-China group 18.8% and the pro business a meagre 4.5%. The remainder of the votes went to the independents.

Increasingly the PRC were caught in a difficult situation. Their behaviour at Tiananman had outraged the international community, not least the people of Hong Kong. It was felt that if China could behave like this on the mainland what price the promises contained in the Joint Declaration? Attacks in the press, in the media, demonstrations in Hong Kong and the financial and vocal support for the democracy movement, all fuelled Chinese suspicions that unless strong action were taken then the territory might well become a base for "subversive" action in the future. On the other hand, too strong a response would destroy confidence in the future of the territory, adversely affect the economic growth and attract a major and unwelcome international response.

The end result was that the Chinese attempted to sooth fears by reiterating time and time again that they intended to abide by the Joint Declaration, but at the same time issued dire warnings against any attempts to make any major changes towards democratisation in the territory before 1997. What is certain is that relations between the United Kingdom and the PRC, in this brief period, were on a downward path with the PRC taking the lead in accusing the British of betraying the"spirit" of the Joint Agreements, and openly declaring their intention of calling the tune on the pace of democratisation.

Such was the situation when Mr Christopher Patten assumed the office of Governor on July 9, 1992. The Chinese, who had refrained from commenting on this political appointment (Mr Patten was the first Governor since the second world war not to come from either the Colonial Office or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), were wary. After all, the three previous governors had considerable experience of dealing with the PRC prior to their appointment and the new man had none. Their misgivings were well founded. Mr Patten introduced a new urgency into Hong Kong which, at first went down well in the territory, if not on the mainland. Within a very short time he introduced his ideas on political reform which produced yet another set of conflicts between Britain, Hong Kong and China.

On October 7, 1992 the new Governor, made a speech to Hong Kong's Legislative Council in which he outlined the course that the territory might take before the handover in 1997. In that speech he specified the four key principles that would determine the government's policies in the five remaining years. The principles reaffirmed the capitalist nature of the system, the maintenance of law and order and an independent judiciary, and most controversially, the advocation of the "widest possible democratic participation by the people of Hong Kong in running their own affairs whilst reenforcing

The content of the substantive proposals in the field of political reforms were in direct contradiction to the ideas and plans of the People's Republic of China. Whilst recognizing the strait jacket of the Basic Law, Mr Patten tried to maximise democratic by separating the Executive Branch from the Legislative Branch; creating a more powerful committee system in the legislature; promoting a maximum number of directly elected seats and to widen the representative base for the functional constituencies and the election committee.

In effect these proposals would maximise the power of the legislative body in a number of ways. It would make it far more representative of the electorate and more independent of the executive branch, markedly reduce the overwhelming dominance of the professional and business elite and transform it into a body which could speak more effectively on behalf of Hong Kong's needs and wishes.

For the PRC, who had always been opposed to a legislature that might show such robust tendencies, these proposals were anathema, particularly when they had not had the chance to veto. After all the previous elections for directly elected seats had overwhelmingly voted for candidates who were highly critical of the PRC and who pushed for greater autonomy as the only way of safeguarding Hong Kong's interests after 1997. The intention of the Basic Law, as seen by the mainland, was to ensure that the Legislative Council was a body which did not challenge Chinese authority, did not agitate for greater autonomy, was composed of a majority largely sympathetic to the PRC, would be subservient to the Chinese will after 1997 and was largely unable to claim legitimacy. Their idea for functional committees, though not specified, was to retain the old system for those already operating, and to create new ones on the old pattern. Their plan, although not articulated, was almost certainly, to carefully select an electoral committee made of sympathetic members, who would elect from their own membership, legislators more sympathetic to the mainland. With such a plan the directly elected element would be easily outvoted in the Legislative Council by those more susceptible to Chinese influence.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the reaction from Beijing was swift and overwhelmingly condemnatory. Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister accused Mr Patten of, "jeopardizing the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and placing obstacles before the smooth transition of Hong Kong in 1997".. China made it quite clear that the proposals violated the spirit of the Basic Law as, "if it is put into practice, it will create a powerful Legislative Council and will reverse the current executive led system of government in Hong Kong". This position, which was repeated time and time again in the ensuing weeks, also attacked the Governor for putting these proposals without consulting the Chinese authorities. In fact Lu Ping, heading the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, warned that," political arrangements that do not converge with the Basic Law on July 1, 1997 will have no future".

The next two years saw the further hardening of the Chinese position despite attempts at negotiations with the British. By 1994 it was obvious that the PRC were in no mood to accept concessions from the British. Beijing not only refused to accept the modest democratisation proposals put forward by Mr Patten but made it quite clear that if he continued with his plans they would block the "Through train" plan. In 1994 the Legislative Council enacted Mr Patten's reforms which led to very rapid response from the Chinese authorities who stated that after the hand over they would dissolve the body and set up a provisional Legislative Council in its place.

To further strengthen its position against Mr Patten and the British the PRC proceeded to assert its authority within the territory. It did so by actively encouraging elite members of the territory to take up positions as advisors to the Beijing government, by increasing the number of delegates from Hong Kong to the National People's Congress and, most importantly, to establish a "second stove" group which, in effect, constituted almost a shadow government.

The political advisers to Hong Kong were carefully chosen to represent persons who were either uncritically pro-Beijing, and hence anti-Patten, or from the business and professional community, who were actively distancing themselves from the British administration. The original membership of 44 which read like a who's who of the local elite was further expanded in 1994 and 1995. The expanded groups, all Hong Kong citizens, were drawn from a wider spectrum, including members of pro-Beijing political parties, NPC and CPPCC delegates, members of the academic community, past members of the Legislative and Executive Councils, academics and past members of the civil service. The advisers were given a high profile by the Chinese government with receptions with high ranking officials. They were increasingly vocal in their opposition to Mr Patten with one of the more influential members even going so far as to suggest the setting up of a "takeover" committee.

This set of appointments was followed by the formalising of a second stove. It was announced at the end of March 1993 that a Preliminary Working Committee for the Special Administrative Region Preparatory Committee was to be established.(Herein after referred to by the less cumbersome title Preliminary Working Committee (PWC). Its chairman was no less than Qian Qichen (Foreign Minister), with the Vice Chairmen including Lu Ping (Director of the State Council, Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office) and Zhou Nan (Hong Kong director of Xinhua). In total there were four mainland Vice Chairmen and three locals. The PWC membership totalled 30 Hong Kong members and 27 mainlanders.

There was absolutely no question that the PWC was being set up as an alternative source of power, in essence a shadow government. It contained, in its membership, such persons as were likely to constitute the greater part of the future SAR Executive Council, and, quite possibly the future Chief Executive. Even a glance at the local membership reflected the power of this organisation. Totally supported, and largely controlled, by the mainland officials, its sub group chairmen were all well established political, judicial and professional figures in the local community. Significantly there was the quick identification of issues for discussion by the PWC and its sub groups which was almost a mirror image of the possible disputes between Britain and the PRC.

An explanation for the increasing confidence of the Chinese leadership can be found in a number of areas. Internally public opinion was beginning to drain away from Mr Patten's proposals. In a series of public opinion polls, the trend was crystal clear. In July 1992 73% of those polled supported attempts to speed

clarified. It is reasonable to assume, however, that it will be far more restricted in power over decision making. When the appointed provisional legislature gives way to elections, probably within twelve months of its establishment in 1997 it will be elected on a narrower basis, thus effectively negating Mr Patten's attempts at a wider franchise for functional and election committee constituencies. The legislative package introduced by Mr Patten was passed on June 30 1994. The Chinese response is well summed up in the Far Eastern Economic Review. 22 September 1994, p.36.

up democracy in the territory even if it meant confrontation with China. That support fell to 62% after the Chinese rejection of the package. By January 1993 the support fell to 30%. Support for Mr Patten himself was also going down from nearly 80% in September 1992 to 60% in April 1993. That trend has continued since that date.

Economically, as indicated earlier the situation is also moving in favour of the People's Republic of China. The reliance on trade with the mainland becomes more obvious by the day with re-exports to and from the China the real growth area in the economy. China, in turn is a major investor in Hong Kong and it is estimated that property purchases in the territory will reach 20% of the total by 1997. The stock market, up until 1992 extremely sensitive to the political barometer and an indicator of business confidence is no longer influenced to anything like the same degree by adverse statements from the mainland over Hong Kong.

There seems little doubt that the PRC has now gained the upper hand in the run up to 1997 stamping their vision of the political system on the territory. As its influence increases that of the British government and the Governor is waning and the best that they can hope for is a rearguard action. The years 1993 to 1995 have seen the crystallisation of tendencies discernable since the publishing of the Basic Law. Events and trends have worked largely in favour of the PRC. The Legislature will now have limited power against a powerful combination of Executive dominance, elite power and Chinese obdurance. The Civil Service, now under strict scrutiny will have its top members vetted by the PRC and the Court of Final Appeal will not be set up before 1997.

The reformist forces continue to press for a democratic interpretation of the Basic Law but are increasingly being marginalised by both internal forces and external pressure from China. A huge push in Hong Kong by pro-Beijing forces is beginning to pay dividends, with public support either moving against Mr Patten's proposals or finding solace in the "do not know" category. The setting up of the PWC, the creation and expansion of the "Beijing advisers", the increase in the number of delegates to the National People's Congress and the increased activities of pro-Beijing parties in the territory all point in one direction.

It would appear that the concept of autonomy is becoming increasingly elastic in its interpretation. Whereas it is fairly certain that there will be considerable autonomy with regard to the broad outlines of the economic system, (indeed it would by surprising if it were otherwise given the changes in the PRC itself), any further democratisation of the political system is out of the question. The forces opposed to such an arrangement are in the process of amassing considerable influence. In the territory itself there are many who feel that a powerful legislative body would be counterproductive to the interests of both Hong Kong and China. The local elite, a group who have always opposed a fully elected legislative body, have allied with the Chinese who, for reasons of their own, wish to create a powerful Executive led system. That Executive will be selected from a group which would not actively oppose Beijing's interests, and will include a large number of the local elite. The confluence of interests between that local group and the mainland constitutes an almost irresistible force, which the British and Mr Patten will find difficult to withstand.

Paradoxically, it would appear that what the Chinese government want is a highly conservative government based on consultation rather than democratic consent, not unlike the traditional British colonial model extant for a long period in Hong Kong. They are increasingly unwilling to allow that model to be modified and are not only stopping any further moves down the democratic path,

but are also reinterpreting the Basic Law to close off some of the avenues that appeared to be opening. They are doing this for a number of reasons. Firstly, because of the fear of Hong Kong subverting the mainland government, a fact emanating primarily from the June 4, 1989 incident. Secondly, because they wish to establish authority in the territory, an authority which in the ultimate analysis lies, beyond any doubt, in Beijing. Thirdly, because they feel (in tandem with the local elite) that democracy is not suitable to the territory in so far as it might encourage "troublesome" elements making "unreasonable" demands which might impede economic prosperity and hamper political stability. Whether or not the political and economic system can withstand the move into the Basic Law Model remains to be seen, but given Hong Kong's resilience in the past there is room for restrained optimism.