Hong Kong: The Business Environment in the new Special Administrative Region.

Since the colony returned to the mainland there have been major developments which have brought into question the sustainability of Hong Kong as a major business centre. The upheavals in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea (as shown in Figure 3, Impact of the Regional Economic Upheaval on page 11), the economic inaction of Japan, and fears of potential economic and banking crises in the PRC, have all rebounded on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). This turmoil in the external environment has exacerbated existing internal structural weaknesses which had laid largely dormant, but which have now awoken with a vengeance. It is not coincidental that the recent speech by the Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, on the presentation of the 1998 budget was entitled, “Riding the Storm. Renewing Hong Kong's Strengths.

In the last fifteen years, the colony has suffered major, if temporary, setbacks (as recorded in Figure 2, Major Movements in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Hang Seng Index on page 10). Two graphic examples illustrate this fact. The first was caused primarily by political factors. In September 1983, poor progress in British and Chinese negotiations on the future of Hong Kong, combined with an economic downturn, helped create a crisis in the stock and property markets and in the banking sector. The second was led by global economic events, as the stock market collapse of 1987 was occasioned by factors largely beyond the control of the Hong Kong government and its regulatory authorities. Both were temporary in nature and were followed by renewed and rapid economic growth.

The economy itself, however, was undergoing a major restructuring. Manufacturing, once the engine of growth for Hong Kong, began a rapid decline as factories relocated in the People's Republic of China, attracted by vastly cheaper land and labour. Increasingly, Hong Kong commerce began to rely on re-exports to and from the PRC, which was now fully engaged in its own economic miracle. This change was relatively painless and helped maintain a buoyant pattern of growth. In matters political there was a recognition that the handover of the colony to its new sovereign master would have ramifications for the business environment: but whether the effects would be benign or otherwise remained unknown. Could Hong Kong retain its business system based on the laissez faire philosophy, or would forces within and without create a business environment less conducive to success ?

There were, and still are, two main schools of thought relating to the future of Hong Kong as a continuing major business centre. They can be divided fairly neatly into two categories, namely the `optimists' and the `pessimists' (obviously the two schools can be put on a spectrum relating to degrees of pessimism and optimism, but the dialectic will suffice for the time being).

THE OPTIMISTS.

The optimists point to the following factors, and argue that these will be the key to the future success of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. These factors begin with an analysis of the successful and smooth path towards transition of the territory from a British colony to a Chinese Special Administrative Region over the period 1984-1997. The Joint Declaration of 1984, which was the blueprint for the future political, economic and social arrangements for the period 1984-2047, guaranteed the “Hong Kong way of life? Its contents promised that an environment highly conducive to the laissez faire philosophy would continue to apply in the future HKSAR. Socialism was quite simply forbidden with the government and the economy guaranteed a high level of autonomy under the rubric of “One Country - Two Systems? That guarantee was further underlined by the Basic Law, which, apart from a few minor economic amendments, also emphasised the desirability of not changing the successful business environment in the future SAR. It was further argued by the optimists that even the political arguments on the nature of political reform between the new Governor Chris Patten and his opponents (both within Hong Kong and on the mainland) had remarkably little overall impact on business confidence.

Indeed, the interests of the business community are more than adequately safeguarded in the institutional framework of the SAR. The new Chief Executive was himself a businessman (whose family shipping business had once been `bailed-out' by Chinese interests), his Executive Council was overwhelmingly made up the business elite, and the Legislative Council was so arranged as to guarantee a majority vote for those representing business. The cumbersome and labyrinthine arrangements for the May 1998 elections to the new Legislative Council are structured to ensure that the business community will triumph regardless of the voting pattern.

The result of these arrangements are a set of fiscal and economic policies whose effects are largely favorable for the business community. Low taxation, prudent budgets with massive surpluses and restrained government expenditures, and close cooperation between the government and the business elite help to sustain a mutually-beneficial symbiotic relationship.

These factors are further reinforced by that pillar of stability, the Hong Kong civil service. The civil service enjoys an enviable reputation for efficiency, honesty and continuity, and is enmeshed in both the formal and informal decision making processes. Members of the civil service sit on the highest decision making bodies, including the Executive Council, thus ensuring constant bureaucratic input. The civil service is a supporter of the laissez faire philosophy of Hong Kong, and there is a considerable degree of communication between the civil service and the business community. The bureaucratic arm consults in depth with business over the feasibility of proposed policies, with both sides participating in advisory bodies which ensure that policies inimical to commercial interests are rarely produced. In turn the powerful business elite has almost instant access to any government bureau should they require that their voice be heard.

The optimists further argue that in the formal structure, the rule of law is still operative in the HKSAR. They point out that despite the change of sovereignty there is considerable evidence of a robust judicial branch operating within a clearly westernised legal tradition, independent of internal or political interference. Internationally, Hong Kong will retain its separate membership in bodies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank.

In the larger community, much is made of the dynamic of the Hong Kong workforce. Optimists point to the fact that Hong Kong's greatest asset, which has allowed it to overcome its lack of any other major resources, is its people. Fully cognizant of the ethic of capitalism, they have shown an amazing capacity to take full advantage of opportunities as and when they arise. Entrepreneurial opportunism is seen as the byword for the tycoon in the SAR, where the ability to adapt quickly and efficiently to changes in the environment determines which ventures survive and prosper. In addition, this entrepreneurial responsiveness has been combined with the highly educated and largely non-unionised workforce to allow the rapid redeployment of those resources needed to quickly address potential new areas of growth. A glance at the manner in which Hong Kong's population has accommodated the change from entrepot to manufacturing entity and now to tertiary service provider clearly illustrates this shared flexibility. Studies such as `The Hong Kong Advantage' by Enright, Scott and Dodwell base their optimistic forecasts of Hong Kong's future largely on this history of adaptation.

It is further argued that the people of Hong Kong are firm supporters of the capitalist way of life. This can be partly explained by the movement of large sectors of the population up the social ladder from a predominantly working class background into the middle classes, where they enjoy rapid improvements in wages and social provisions in areas such as housing, health and education. The level of acceptance of capitalism in Hong Kong is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that there is not a single party in Hong Kong, of those which have any electoral appeal whatsoever, that does not accept the broad principle of laissez faire.

The optimists also point to the pivotal role of the People's Republic of China in the twenty years since the `Four Modernisations'. The huge transformation of the Chinese economy has had enormous impacts on Hong Kong in a number of significant areas. Firstly, it allowed the reallocation of the resources of Hong Kong firms into Shenzhen, and beyond, further into Guangdong, where lower land and wage costs and a sympathetic investment regime have combined to increase productivity. Secondly, Hong Kong has profited greatly by capitalizing on the tremendous increase in exports from the mainland, which are generally re-exported through Hong Kong to their destinations, primarily the U.S. and Western Europe. Thirdly, Hong Kong is by far the greatest conduit through which investment is channeled, either from local sources or from overseas, into Guangdong and the rest of China. Hong Kong plays a particularly important role as the locus for many of the influential overseas-Chinese business networks which are major investors in the mainland. Fourthly, Hong Kong benefits from the entry of multinational companies, banks and other service industries which have begun operating in China. Fifthly, increasing numbers of Hong Kong people travel to Guangdong to provide managerial services, but remain located in Hong Kong. At the same time the People's Republic of China is a major investor in Hong Kong, in such areas as banking, hotels, property and tourism. Some optimists believe that Hong Kong's capitalist values, prosperity, and growing middle class, which have already contributed greatly to the success of China's modernization to date, will not only be maintained, but will ultimately triumph in China itself.

In the wider external environment there is considerable sympathy towards Hong Kong. The United States of America, Europe and Japan, all major investors in the territory, continue to see Hong Kong as an excellent launching pad for the China market, and recognize that maintaining the highly autonomous nature of the SAR is critical to perpetuating its fertile business environment. It is also widely believed that China will act to ensure the success of its `One country - Two systems' model in order to reassure Macau in preparation for its 1999 handover, and particularly in order to tempt Taiwan into closer consideration of reunification.

THE PESSIMISTS.

However, there are those who are far less sanguine about Hong Kong's business prospects in the future. Indeed some of the predictions, such as those of Marc Faber, paint a very sombre picture, suggesting a retrogression of the territory to the status of a fishing village in the years to come. Whilst he is probably exaggerating to a large extent (there are no fish to catch any longer in Hong Kong's waters given the levels of pollution) there are worrying factors which it would be unwise to ignore.

Perhaps one of the most pressing concerns relates to the degree of autonomy that Hong Kong can retain under its new management. It is suggested that such levels of democracy that Hong Kong currently possesses will be increasingly diluted by interference from the political masters in Beijing and by certain local members of the elite who will initiate such action in order to please the PRC authorities. Leaving aside the thorny question of whether full democracy is a prerequisite for a capitalist business environment, the thesis has been presented that levels of corruption imported from the mainland, interference in the government's freedom to regulate the economy, and preference for other provinces at Hong Kong's expense will reduce its competitiveness and leach its legendary dynamism. Milton Friedman has said that he does not believe the link of the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar will be maintained for long after the handover, while Bowring expects that the Hong Kong dollar will not retain its relevancy long under Chinese rule: “the Hong Kong dollar will survive like the Scottish pound.

Additionally, questions have been raised on the future of the Basic Law and the legal system. The continued status of the Basic Law, that document which defines the political, legal, social, cultural, economic and business environment of the Hong Kong SAR, has been questioned by those who express the concern that it is subordinate to the National People's Congress in the PRC. There is no entrenched means of safeguarding the autonomy of Hong Kong should forces on the mainland seek to make retrogressive changes. Pessimists point to examples of where they feel the Basic Law has been violated, albeit to date in the political institutional field. Nossal predicts that the `high degree of autonomy' promised for Hong Kong may become a “high degree of ambiguity?

Internally, the fear has been clearly expressed that structural problems exist which have not been adequately addressed, and which may well lead to a worsening business environment. There are, indeed, some worrying economic indicators. Official unemployment figures showed a disturbing increase to 3.5% in April 1998, and are predicted to rise significantly higher in coming months. On April 19, 1998, Financial Secretary Donald Tsang advised Hong Kong people to “be psychologically prepared for a gloomy employment outlook amid the regional financial turmoil.? The most important areas of the economy are experiencing major downturns. Prices on rented and private property have fallen over 15% since the third quarter of 1997, and by almost 30% from their pre-handover peak. Receipts from tourism, a major foreign currency earner (generating approximately US$10 billion annually) dropped nearly 25% in January and February compared with the same period in 1997. Domestic manufacturing has been declining at an accelerating rate over the last twenty years: in 1981 it comprised 24% of GDP, but fell to 18% of GDP in 1990 and 9% in 1995. In terms of exports, local manufactured goods represent only 15% of the total, the remainder being made up of the re-exports which have been so vital in generating the great growth experienced by Hong Kong.

It is argued by the pessimists that the cataclysmic decline in manufacturing and the over-reliance on property, re-exports and the service sector have left Hong Kong highly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of external forces. Such sensitivity was put to the test recently with the economic crises in South East and East Asia. Many of these nations experienced dramatic devaluations in their currencies (see Figure 4, Impact of the Regional Economic Upheaval on Economic Growth and Currencies on page 11), thus leaving the highly priced and pegged Hong Kong dollar in a precarious position. There are still fears that another lurch in these economies could markedly and adversely affect Hong Kong, particularly if the PRC was forced to devalue its currency in response to a renewed crisis.

Suggestions of potential political instability have also been voiced. With rising economic uncertainty as a backdrop there have been suggestions that the legitimacy of the government of the HKSAR might increasingly come under question from certain quarters. The low turn out for elections, the format of the electoral system itself, and the undermining of confidence in the civil service's ability to effectively administer policy have sent alarm bells ringing for the pessimists.

Regionally, the fear of Hong Kong losing out to rapidly emerging provinces in China has sent shivers through certain spines. With the modernisation of Guangdong Province in the South and, in particular, Shanghai in the North, many of the economic functions performed in Hong Kong have come under scrutiny. Guangdong has inherited Hong Kong's manufacturing mantle and is building its own shipping export structure and seeking to reduce its dependency on Hong Kong for managerial skills and expertise. In other words, it is gearing up to challenge the very areas where Hong Kong had the competitive edge. The spectacular rise of Shanghai, its banking, insurance, financial institutions, and its increasingly sophisticated stock market, bodes ill for the future relevancy of the SAR, according to the pessimists.

In essence the factors outlined above lead the pessimists, not surprisingly, to a very bleak view of the short, medium, and long term future for Hong Kong. They are in direct opposition to the optimists who either ignore or minimise the expected impact of these negative criteria. Which position should be taken?

OPTIMISM OR PESSIMISM?

POLITICS AND THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT.

When attempting to analyse the present situation and predict the future of the business environment in Hong Kong, it must be remembered that we are still broadly in the post-handover transition period. What is certain from the outset is that it would be both wrong and irresponsible to lay the blame for the hostile challenges facing the Hong Kong business environment solely at the feet of the new SAR government. Indeed, many of the problems now emerging are the function of an historical legacy handed down from the colonial period, or are the consequence of external forces over which Hong Kong has little if any control.

The political system to date has endured the handover far better than the pessimists would have dared hope. The Chief Executive, Mr. Tung Chi-Hwa, despite some early blunders, has behaved reasonably prudently. Although not universally admired, he has avoided any greatly controversial policies, and has kept a low profile, emphasising the theme of `business as usual'. He retained the overwhelmingly popular Anson Chan as Chief Secretary and the soundly competent Donald Tsang as Financial Secretary, thus ensuring a high degree of continuity at the top levels of his administration. The elections, promised to replace the questionably legitimate Provisional Legislature which held office from June 30, 1998, were held on May 24, 1998. Although the electoral system was unduly complicated and elicited a high degree of political apathy, a fact reflected in a low turn out, there was no widespread opposition to its format, and even many of those opposed to the structure put up candidates for office. Indeed, not one of the candidates for any of the constituencies could be described as radical. All support the broad theme of a capitalist system in Hong Kong and believe in the concept, if not the pure application, of laissez faire. In any case, the election is so designed to ensure a majority for the business elite. In addition, the business community retains the high ground of political influence within the institutional framework, dominating the Legislative Council and the Executive Council. On balance, and despite the bias towards the business elite in the institutional structures, it would nevertheless appear, that if political stability is a criteria for a successful business environment, then the optimists have the upper hand..

On the broader front, there is little evidence to suggest a radical cleavage in the body politic. Opinion polls on the question of confidence in the `one country, two systems' model and the form of government in Hong Kong after the transition are not discouraging. Certainly there has been no diminution in the number of peaceful demonstrations, some of which have led to a favourable response by the government. The media remains robustly independent and critical of government policies where deemed relevant. There are no indications whatsoever of political unrest in the general public, and disturbances are generally related to the democratisation debate and are limited to a tiny minority, such as the `April 5 Movement', which has consistently failed to gain support. (Of course, the pessimists argue that the government has not yet been tested by a sustained downturn in the economy, and warn that much of the political stability is based on the expectation of increasing affluence.)

Nevertheless, all sectors of the community, although not in the same proportions, have become more affluent over the last twenty years. As mentioned earlier, the social welfare system has rapidly improved during this time, and some of the worst effects of an economic downturn, should it be sustained, should be mitigated by the huge public housing provision (43%), excellent and inexpensive hospital facilities, free education for all who need it under the age of sixteen, and a rapidly expanding and relatively cheap tertiary education sector. At present, unemployment payments are virtually non-existent, given the assumption that full employment makes them unnecessary. However, unemployment has begun to rise rather rapidly, and the government will no doubt be forced to address this problem eventually. The best choice of policy option is currently a matter of debate, but the consensus view is that the government will prefer to seek job creation through investments in infrastructure, rather than make direct payments to the unemployed. Whichever approach is followed, the majority of the population is unlikely to reject the broad framework in which the political system operates, although it can be expected to support incremental changes rather than major overhauls. Thus it may seem, in the absence of any further unanticipated crises, that a guardedly optimistic scenario for the business environment in the political arena is empirically more persuasive than the scenarios of the pessimists.

ECONOMICS AND THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT.

On the question of the economic situation there is greater cause for concern, and there is the distinct possibility that here the pessimists are gaining the upper hand, at least in the short term. There can be no question that Hong Kong's economy has carried hidden structural weaknesses for some time, and that these are now being exposed. Hong Kong has lost virtually its entire manufacturing base to China, and there is little doubt that this pattern will continue into the future given the mainland's comparative advantage in land and labour factor costs.

Internally, property prices in both the commercial and private sectors show no sign of imminent recovery, and little prospect of improvement in the medium term. The Hong Kong dollar is clearly overvalued, and may well be forced off its U.S. dollar peg if the PRC devalues its currency in reaction to further lurches in the other East and South East Asian economies. Tourism continues to decline, and retail sales are plummeting. Unemployment is rising, and the declining prices at government land sales give further indication of a lack of business confidence.

Externally the position of the pessimists also seems to be gaining ground. The large re-export component of the Hong Kong economy is highly vulnerable to external developments. The improvements in the standard of professionalism of Chinese producers make it increasingly less necessary to ship goods initially to Hong Kong, for quality inspection, packaging and overseas transportation, on the way to their final destination. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the lucrative margin earned by Hong Kong middleman (averaging 25%) on consumer goods will certainly decrease over time. The likely eventual agreement for direct air and sea links between the mainland and Taiwan, thus bypassing Hong Kong, will also have a significant negative impact on economic activity in Hong Kong. The effects of continued growth and success of Shanghai, and other mainland coastal areas, should also not be underestimated.

One question that begs an answer is whether the worrying economic indicators for the business environment can be addressed successfully, or whether Hong Kong is doomed to a slow decline in future years. To be fair the territory still has considerable advantages which should not be too readily discounted. The government still possesses huge financial reserves which may be brought into play, the workforce is highly educated and highly adaptable, and the territory is a hub of modern communications with a highly developed infrastructure. The financial sector is effective, sophisticated, and subject to a well regulated framework. Corruption in both the public and private sectors is low, and the economy operates within a stable political environment.

The actual operation of laissez faire principles in Hong Kong has been undergoing quite marked modification for some time, with the benefits clearly outweighing the costs. Government intervention, as mentioned previously, has been increasing in the field of social provision. Intervention has also been evident in the increasing regulation over business activity itself in such areas as security and futures markets, safety and fire regulations, compulsory provident funds, bus franchises, pollution regulations, and consumer rights.

A major debate rages at present over the appropriate extent to which the government should become involved in leading industrial planning, or whether government should just leave the market to sort itself out entirely. Demands are coming from all directions for the government to take action, and for the Chief Executive to show decisive leadership. The reaction from the administration has been typically conservative, and the Financial Secretary (along with many in the powerful civil service) clearly believes that to increase dramatically government intervention, in the form of subsidies, tax breaks, or any further distortion of market mechanisms, would be ultimately damaging to the business environment. If the unfavourable economic conditions continue to worsen, however, pressure for action will mount from labour, manufacturers, property developers, exporters and a host of other sectors. However, each group, hardly surprisingly, is pleading a special case according to perceived need. The Financial Secretary has made it quite clear that any further intervention, if it takes place, will be slow and “prudent? and would be regarded as a temporary deviation from the levels of government expenditure now extant. On this question, once more, the likelihood of intervention levels approaching those of some western economies is not entertained.

However, the pessimists' arguments, at least in the short term, have become more compelling. Although it would be entirely inappropriate to adopt the worst case `fishing village' scenario there are sufficient indicators to suggest that hard times have descended upon the business environment in the context of the economy.

The People's Republic of China.

Perhaps the most crucial variable in the business environment is the role that the People's Republic of China must play. Many of the fears articulated before July 1, 1997 have not been realized. The PRC has adopted a hands-off policy by allowing considerable autonomy to the territory under the rubric of `One County - Two Systems.' When necessary the PRC has also come to the aid of Hong Kong, as it did during the steep fall in the Hong Kong Stock market in late October 1997 when it pledged its resources to the defense of the dollar link. Also, as mentioned previously, Hong Kong is still the largest investor in China and remains a crucial point of inward investment and re-exports. Hong Kong is, without question, an integral part of the economy of China, with both parties enjoying benefits from the reciprocal relationship. In the longer term there is a fear that the successful coastal regions of China will overtake Hong Kong, and thus downgrade the importance of the territory. Although the concern that Hong Kong is becoming just “another Chinese city?has been articulated by the pessimists, , the indications of that are by no means conclusive. In the meantime, the PRC allows Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy in the conduct of its own affairs and even allows the SAR to retain separate membership from the mainland in international organisations. In the sense that the business environment will be allowed to develop without external pressure or interference from the mainland, there is thus room for optimism.

The wider external environment.

In the broader field of international trade, upon which Hong Kong is highly reliant, any downturn in the world economy hits Hong Kong fast and hard. It is in this area that considerable concern for the future business environment has also been expressed. What, for instance, given the huge reliance of Hong Kong upon re-exports, would happen if the mainland, for whatever reason, suffered a contraction in its external trade. What are the costs to Hong Kong should a world or regional stock market crash take place? What would Hong Kong do if political instability in the region rebounded upon it? Events in Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand since mid-1997 have already had a marked knock-on effect upon Hong Kong. How would Hong Kong cope with a devalued Chinese currency should this occur? Indeed the external environment, certainly in Asia, is showing clear indications of marked political, social and economic volatility. If such volatility continues, and there is much to conclude that it might, then the pessimists' case once again becomes more persuasive at least in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion.

A sober assessment of the Hong Kong business environment seems to point towards difficult times ahead. Internally, there are many structural economic problems which must be addressed, in such areas as the over reliance of re-exports, the cataclysmic decline in manufacturing, the growing unemployment problem and the falling property market; add to that the decline in tourism, retail sales and the stock market; factor-in increased bankruptcies, high interest rates, and an overvalued dollar, and it is clear that business confidence cannot be high.

Externally, Hong Kong may well be losing its competitive edge, particularly in comparison with China. The territory is also a hostage to international forces over which it has little control. Recent events in Asia have clearly demonstrated the fragile business environments operating in many countries in the region. With respect to the People's Republic of China, upon which Hong Kong relies to an excessive degree, many suggest that its business environment may be entering a negative phase.

In many ways Hong Kong's economic situation is new in the sense that an entire generation has grown up in the expectation of continued growth and increasing prosperity. Some might go so far as to suggest that a degree of complacency was a built into the assumptions of the people. (This was believed also in most of the East and South East Asian countries where the shocks have been even more devastating). Perhaps a corrective was necessary to rethink the economic direction that Hong Kong was moving along.

There is little question that there is still much to commend Hong Kong's business environment as a force capable of overcoming those problems.. It remains a politically stable system with a powerful government, wedded to the philosophy of capitalism and capable of acting decisively in difficult times.. Government policies, after the transition, remain directed towards retaining an attractive business environment. It remains wedded to a sound legal system, an efficient civil service, low taxes, and control over corruption. It has huge accumulated financial reserves, and a well regulated banking and financial sector. The population is well educated, adaptable, and able to respond to rapidly changing conditions. No internal forces seek to radically alter the broad consensual framework in which the business environment operates. Under such conditions, and given the proven adaptability of Hong Kong, many of the problems outlined by the pessimists, although causing a short-to-medium term decline in business confidence, may be surmounted by its more favourable holistic business environment .

FIGURES

Figure 1, Comparative GNP per Capita

Economy

GNP per capita

PPP estimates of GNP per capita

Dollars

Avg. Ann. growth

US=100

PPP GNP

1995

1985-1995

1987

1995

Switzerland

40,630

0.2

105.4

95.9

25,860

Japan

39,640

2.9

75.3

82.0

22,110

United States

26,980

1.3

100.0

26,980

Singapore

26,730

6.2

56.1

84.4

22,770

Hong Kong

22,990

4.8

70.7

85.1

22,950

Canada

19,380

0.4

84.6

78.3

21,130

Australia

18,720

1.4

70.1

70.2

18,940

U.K.

18,700

1.4

72.0

71.4

19,260

China

620

8.3

6.3

10.8

2,920

Source: World Bank, “Selected World Development Indicators? In World Development Report 1997, pp. 214-215.

Figure 2, Major Movements in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Hang Seng Index

Source: Hang Seng Bank (1998) Hang Seng Index Historical Performance [Online]. Available from: http://www.hangseng.com/online/history/hsche.html [Accessed March 24, 1998].

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